

began at the Faculty Club frequently spilled over into the afternoon. Kissinger felt no compunction about asking anyone to address the Seminar. There were no honoraria in the early years; the pleasure of speaking to a lively group of foreigners seemed a sufficient inducement. Kissinger often asked a member of the Harvard faculty to attend. David Riesman, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., and McGeorge Bundy were frequent guests; so, also, were national figures like Eleanor Roosevelt and Walter Reuther; critics and writers like Thornton Wilder and John Crowe Ransom; journalists as different as James Reston and William Buckley.

Kissinger made himself available to Seminar members in his minuscule, simply furnished office in the Harvard Yard several days a week. In the evening, he and his wife entertained Seminar participants in their home; the talk would go on for many hours, politics being the principal subject. Seminar participants, from the day they arrived, knew that they owed their summer in Cambridge to Kissinger. They admired him for his intelligence, but also for his industry. In just under eight weeks, summer after summer, Kissinger became personally acquainted with dozens of men and women whose names he had not known six months earlier. Inevitably, some were more interesting to him than others; he, in turn, could be a fairly forbidding personality to shy or inarticulate men and women who did not share his political interests.

After only a few years, Kissinger's network of foreign friends—persons in the prime of their political or professional lives—was unrivaled. No American could boast acquaintance with a more diverse group of European and Asian intellectuals; few had such intimate knowledge of the political situation abroad, as described by a great variety of political informants. If Kissinger gave his guests some slight introduction to the complexities of American life, they reciprocated with invaluable insights into their own countries. Many of the Seminar participants became his friends, and corresponded regularly with him. When he traveled abroad, he knew personally hundreds of men and women in various parts of the world; it seemed entirely reasonable that he avail himself of the hospitality they offered. Many a journalist, politician, and civil servant thought it a singular honor to be asked by Kissinger to effect an introduction to someone whom he was anxious to meet. Kissinger was not just another American visitor, but someone who had demonstrated extraordinary dialectical skills in a great variety of Cambridge encounters. Former Seminar members—particularly those who knew him best—realized that he would work hard at any interview they arranged, and that their own reputations would not be diminished by the encounter. It is difficult to exaggerate the help that Kissinger received from his International Seminar friends.

In March 1952, Kissinger became the editor of a new journal, entitled,

Stephen R. Croft. WW Norton & Comp
N.Y. 1973

appropriately enough, *Confluence*. Again, William Elliott, in his capacity as Director of the Harvard Summer School, stood behind the effort. The first number, published in a format that was both inexpensive and unimaginative, dealt with a cosmic theme—"What Are the Bases of Civilization?" Later issues were more modest, dealing with subjects as different as education, the mass media, religion, ideology, and the problems of the nuclear age. At a time when politics divided Europe, isolating most intellectuals in narrow ideological conventicles, Kissinger thought of a journal that transcended these boundaries; he published without reference to them. *Confluence* began as a dialogue between Europeans and Americans; in time, it extended its purview to Asia, though Western Europe and the United States remained its major intellectual focus. Many of the essays were ephemeral; a number had great distinction. Kissinger, with exceedingly modest resources, managed to produce a journal that belonged neither to the left nor to the right, and that published poets and novelists, both famous and obscure, together with philosophers, historians, and political scientists of diverse intellectual leanings, and politicians—liberal, socialist, and conservative. A journal that published Reinhold Niebuhr and Enoch Powell, Alberto Moravia and André Malraux, Kari Jaspers and Joyce Cary, Denis Healy and Walt Rostow, Victor Weisskopf and Bertrand de Jouvenel could not be said to belong to any identifiable political or professional group. Kissinger spread his net as wide as the times permitted him to. He was never able to penetrate the Soviet world, but he made the greatest efforts to seek out the greatest variety of opinion in those places where he was free to go.

When Kissinger ceased to be a graduate student, he could look back on two unique experiences; he had been instrumental in founding the International Seminar and *Confluence*. He knew that their continued operation and vitality depended very largely on him, and that they had contributed as much to his education as anything that he had ever done. Unlike so many of his contemporaries in graduate school, Kissinger did not measure time by when he gained his doctorate or when he started to teach. His life in 1952, when his dissertation was only half finished, was not substantially different from what it was three years later. Academic credentials did not provide Kissinger with the opportunities or the associations that he prized. While many senior members of his department seemed scarcely aware of his presence, let alone of what he was doing, newspaper editors in Frankfurt and Paris vied for his time. There was nothing very conventional in Kissinger's graduate-student experience.

In 1955, a new association, of a very different kind, became important to him. Gordon Dean, formerly head of the Atomic Energy Commission, in writing the Foreword to Kissinger's book, *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy*, told how the Council on Foreign Relations in 1954 had

"called together a panel of exceptionally qualified individuals to explore all factors which are involved in the making and implementing of foreign policy in the nuclear age." Gordon Dean, selected to chair the panel, met with the group for many months. After almost a year, Kissinger was asked whether he would join the group as its study director. The appointment proved to be the most important event in Kissinger's adult life, second only to his decision to enroll at Harvard. Neither the Council nor Kissinger recognized the full potentialities of the appointment. Nor, for that matter, did Gordon Dean know what he had done. As he explained, "We asked Dr. Kissinger, fully exposed to the facts and the views of the group, to write a book for which he alone would be responsible, and we ended our deliberations fully respectful of each other and with a final exhortation: 'Good luck, Dr. Kissinger. If you can make anything out of the efforts of this panel we will be eternally grateful.'" Kissinger was given the opportunity to write a book. The Council had given numerous other men at other times the same opportunity. Their works, most frequently, had fallen dead from the presses. The Council's list of publications was long; there were not many titles that had brought great fame to their authors. The Council's record in this respect was no different from that of other similar organizations.

But what precisely was the Council on Foreign Relations? Many knew it principally through its quarterly journal, *Foreign Affairs*, which was founded soon after World War I, and by the late 1930s had established itself as the most prestigious American publication dealing with foreign policy. The journal enjoyed a great reputation in New York and Washington; important political figures both in the United States and abroad sometimes used it to disseminate their foreign policy views. That certain of the articles were ghostwritten sometimes obviously so, did not really matter. To know that a Prime Minister or Foreign Secretary wished to have his name associated with a particular policy was more important than whether or not he had written the article himself. The journal was well edited, and while it could never be called exciting, it had the merit of reaching men who were known to be influential. Kissinger, beginning in the middle 1950s, published extensively in *Foreign Affairs*. He felt a great indebtedness to its editor, Hamilton Fish Armstrong, and to the managing editor, Philip Quigg. *Foreign Affairs*, however, was only the Council's public face; Kissinger's greatest debt was to the Council as it existed for its members.

The Council on Foreign Relations, in the mid-1950s, was "unreformed"; it was a men's club, to which only United States citizens were eligible; half its membership lived or worked in the New York area; the other half were scattered throughout the world, with the preponderant

number on the East Coast, many temporarily or permanently based in Washington, D.C. Having some interest in foreign affairs was mandatory for someone proposed for Council membership; actual experience in an important governmental position, civilian or military, generally helped advance a candidate's election prospects. In the New York area, where so many leading bankers, lawyers, and business executives had at one time or other held a major governmental post, the Council's membership list read like a Who's Who of former high governmental officials. It included also a number of foundation executives, professors, and journalists. Many of the names were familiar; the greatest number had at one time or other held a position that gave them some public exposure. Some were simply very wealthy men, recognizable as such. Whether in or out of government, intending to return or having no such interest, most members professed to some interest in foreign affairs. It was useful for them to have access to an organization like the Council. They enjoyed the opportunity to meet each other there, and felt more in touch with the outside world through the distinguished foreign guests invited by the Council to speak in meetings that were always "off the record." The organization was ideally suited to the needs and interests of men who did not have daily access to governmental information, who were generally located in or near New York, and who enjoyed the reality or illusion of believing that foreign affairs was a compelling subject.

The Council's practice during the year (except for the summer months) was to invite members to meetings two or three times each week to hear prominent American or foreign dignitaries speak. Depending on the fame of the speaker—and, to a lesser extent, on his subject—as many as several hundred Council members might come to the Council's house on East 68th Street on a late weekday afternoon to listen to the Council's guest. The meetings were brief; a speaker rarely addressed the Council for more than forty-five minutes, and there was generally some time left for discussion. Despite the pledge of secrecy, few men ever chose to use the Council to elaborate policies that were new and that they wished to air. The Council was not a place for thinking out loud. The talks were sometimes factual, generally of a kind that could be delivered anywhere in the world before a group of knowledgeable men, assembled to discuss a topic whose principal configurations were known. Where the individual was unusually candid or brilliant, there was some possibility of interest being sustained for the whole hour. Where these qualities were lacking, the talk might be desultory, with the general discussion (which was no more than a question-and-answer session) showing the same dull pattern. Since members were free to leave immediately after the talk, and since train schedules to suburban New York and Connecticut communities often governed

departures quite as much as the intrinsic merits of the presentation, it was impossible to gauge the success of a meeting simply by the number who stayed to the end.

Given the quality of many of the meetings, both speakers and Council members must occasionally have asked themselves whether they had not participated in a purely ceremonial affair. For many, it did not seem to matter. Speakers were generally gratified by those who came to hear them. No Foreign Secretary, Minister of Finance, Prime Minister, or President, coming from abroad and looking at the list of those in attendance, could fail to believe that New York's financial elite had turned out. As for Council members, they frequently came out of curiosity about the person scheduled to speak, sometimes out of friendship for him, and very often simply to register their interest in foreign affairs. Those for whom foreign affairs had an economic, scholarly, or journalistic interest had reason enough to come. Many others simply came to see friends in a setting that was always congenial.

In addition to the afternoon meetings, the Council sponsored small dinners and lunches to which a selected number of Council members were invited. An effort was made to bring together those members who had the greatest reason to be interested in the specific activities of the invited speaker. At the dinners, particularly, the pace was somewhat relaxed; the speaker, sitting at his place at table, might address the group informally for forty-five minutes or an hour, with general discussion following. Dinners generally started at 7:00 P.M., and they were expected to end by 9:30 P.M. Again, these were not occasions that generated heated debate or argument, but they did provide a very useful way for Council members to take measure of their guest. The mood was almost always informal, even when the speaker occupied a great position in his own country.

For most members, these activities exhausted the services that they expected the Council to provide. A few made use of the Council's excellent library, and a number belonged each year to one or other of the special study groups that the Council organized on specific topics, in which participation was restricted to invited members. The study groups varied greatly both in their quality and seriousness; men who gathered late in the afternoon, after a full day in the office, were not generally in the best condition to discuss seriously complex foreign policy issues. Still, the intelligence and articulateness of individual members often made certain of these study groups, which met once or twice a month, agreeable occasions. A great deal depended on the chairman of the group; even more important, perhaps, was the participation of members of the Council staff; they prepared papers for the meeting and kept many of the groups going.

It was Henry Kissinger's great good fortune to become associated with a very distinguished group that provided assistance to him of a very spe-

cial kind. *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy* was Kissinger's book; it would not, however, have been written in the way that it was, or have achieved the renown that it did, but for the Council's sponsorship. The group included a number of extraordinary individuals—men whom Kissinger would not otherwise have met. Their range of interests made them ideal interlocutors for Kissinger. They were the first men Kissinger had met with extensive governmental experience at the highest levels; a number were men of great scientific and technological learning who understood the new weapons systems as few others in the country did. Kissinger's study group included, among others, Hamilton Fish Armstrong; Hanson Baldwin, military editor of the *New York Times*; Lloyd Berkner, research physicist and scientific administrator, expert in radar and electronics; Robert Bowie, most recently of the State Department, soon to be appointed director of the Harvard University Center for International Affairs; McGeorge Bundy, dean of the Faculty of Arts and Sciences of Harvard University; William Burden, financier, formerly Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Air; Thomas Finletter, former Secretary of the Air Force; General James Gavin, famed commander of the 82nd Airborne Division, later ambassador to France; Roswell Gilpatric, lawyer, former Under-Secretary of the Air Force, later Deputy Secretary of Defense; Caryl Haskins, research scientist, president of the Carnegie Institution of Washington, consultant on research and development to the Secretaries of State and Defense; Joseph Johnson, president and trustee of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; Air Force General James McCormack, Jr., vice-president of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, later chairman of the Communication Satellite and the Aerospace Corporations; Paul Nitze, former director of the Policy Planning Staff of the Department of State, later Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs and Secretary of the Navy; Frank Pace, Jr., former Secretary of the Army, chairman of General Dynamics Corporation; James Perkins, vice-president of the Carnegie Corporation, later president of Cornell University; Don K. Price, Jr., vice-president of the Ford Foundation, later dean of the Graduate School of Public Administration at Harvard; I. I. Rabi, Nobel Prize-winning physicist, member of the President's Science Advisory Committee, vice-president of the International Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy; David Rockefeller, of the Chase Manhattan Bank; Oscar Ruebhausen, attorney, friend and adviser to Nelson Rockefeller; General Walter Bedell Smith, former Under-Secretary of State, ambassador to Russia, and director of the Central Intelligence Agency; Carroll Wilson of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, formerly general manager of the Atomic Energy Commission; and Arnold Wolfers, historian, professor of international relations at Yale University. The group combined extraordinary intellectual re-

Howell, later United States senator from Illinois; David Sarnoff, director of the Radio Corporation of America and the National Broadcasting Company; Charles Spofford, lawyer, active in the North Atlantic Council; Edward Teller, physicist, former assistant director of the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratories, later director of the Lawrence Radiation Laboratory of the University of California; Frazar Wilde, insurance executive; and, for a time, Robert Anderson, former Secretary of the Navy, Deputy Secretary of Defense, later Secretary of the Treasury; and Gordon Dean. These over-all panel members served also on one or other of the six individual panels, together with others only scarcely less well known.

Kissinger, because of his association with the Project, extended his acquaintanceship with some of the more prominent Americans who enjoyed a national reputation for public service. These were all exceedingly busy people, and it fell to the staff and a hundred or so others who served as consultants to provide the raw material from which the panels eventually developed their reports. They were uneven in quality and express admirably the limitations of all such collaborative research projects. Kissinger, however, had no reason to regret what he had done for the Project. He had found an additional forum for his ideas. More important, however, it provided him with an opportunity to come to know Nelson Rockefeller. Their relations were extremely close; the two managed the Project together. Rockefeller became Kissinger's friend.

The Special Studies Project would have been inconceivable without Nelson Rockefeller. He inspired the effort, and it was his personality that led otherwise busy men and women to accept his invitation to serve. When he invited them in 1956, his greatest asset was his name; not so obvious, perhaps, was his political promise. Although Nelson Rockefeller had never held a major elective political post, many both inside and outside the Republican Party in 1956 hoped that he would one day contend for high office, perhaps for the presidency itself. Rockefeller's immense fortune, wedded to what was generally conceded to be his highly marketable political personality, made that a not entirely outlandish possibility. Having some governmental experience, but no knowledge of politics greater than that of any number of others who wandered in and out of the federal bureaucracy on an appointive basis, and who made their principal professional commitments elsewhere, Rockefeller desperately needed instruction in the rudiments of public policy. His name, fame, and age militated against his doing this by starting at the bottom of the political ladder. In the American system, it made sense for him to aspire to a higher place.

Many who joined the over-all panel of the Special Studies Project were aware that they were in the presence of someone who might be president of the United States in the 1960s or 1970s. Their decision to join the

group was not unaffected by that awareness, though most accepted the invitation because they believed that the study had promise, and that they would learn something from it. They were flattered to be asked, and enjoyed the attentions paid them by a man who believed absolutely in the crucial importance of the enterprise. His hospitality delighted them, and his energy and enthusiasm were infectious. There was every reason for the operation to succeed. Nelson Rockefeller proved to be a vigorous and active chairman; he took his responsibilities seriously, and the meetings of the over-all panel, whether in the offices of the Rockefeller Brothers Fund or, more rarely, in Nelson Rockefeller's home, were lively and spirited occasions. This, at least, is how they are remembered.

While the Special Studies Project prided itself on its political objectivity, making almost a fetish of involving both Democrats and Republicans, its mere existence was a reproof to the Eisenhower administration. Four years after the Republicans had returned to power in Washington, a prominent New York Republican thought it necessary to create a study group that would establish guidelines for future public policy. A vigorous Republican administration, which had engaged the sympathy and support of its most ardent party members, would not have offered an excuse for the creation of such a body. Although Rockefeller refrained from criticizing the President or any of the others who governed in Washington, the recommendation of alternative policies implied at least some dissatisfaction with the way things were going. The Eisenhower "team" clearly did not include a number of younger men and women who believed that the Republicans were in a position to do better than they were doing.

The Special Studies Project did not even think to question the proposition that a consensus could be reached on major issues of national and international policy. In 1956, it seemed entirely reasonable to assemble Democrats and Republicans, mix them with a number of Independents, and then wait for agreement to follow. There were difficult moments, of course—Adolf Berle and Edward Teller did not always see eye to eye, and others disagreed—but no one expected the group to break apart; no one intended that it should. Agreement was expected; indeed, it was planned for. Such a procedure would not have worked nearly so well during the Depression; nor would it have been conceivable in the last years of Lyndon Johnson's presidency. It seemed entirely right in the context of 1956; no one raised questions about the "representativeness" of the group; no one resigned in outrage over any of the recommendations. The national consensus seemed real, and though many of the reports found fault with specific governmental policies, there was nothing shrill or wounding in what was said.

It was a good time for learning; Nelson Rockefeller proved an avid student. The Special Studies Project, more than any other single experience,

gave Rockefeller the basic education in public policy that he lacked. His principal teacher was Henry Kissinger, who served as coordinator of studies and accepted the assignment of keeping the chairman informed. Kissinger interpreted the work of the various groups; he met frequently with Rockefeller, sometimes in the company of one or other of the large staff of personal associates that a man in Rockefeller's position commanded. Kissinger was teacher both to an individual and to his entourage; he soon won respect from both, though this did not mean that all his suggestions were enthusiastically accepted. Rockefeller was a valuable "property" in several senses of the term; those who protected him, or imagined they needed to, jealously guarded a reputation that they did not wish to see compromised. It was important to them that Rockefeller's name not be associated with policies that might raise adverse criticism. They were not as anxious for their chief to take "risks" as Kissinger, living with a very different philosophy, seemed to be. They recognized the warm relations that existed between the two men, and did nothing to impede them, but they never forgot the importance of being politically prudent. As a consequence, inevitably, the reports were somewhat more tepid and less controversial than they might otherwise have been. Also, inevitably, a great effort was made to guarantee that the reports received the support of all members of the over-all panel.

Rockefeller's legal and business associates operated pretty much as such men did when they or their colleagues became part of the federal bureaucracy. Kissinger's views on the attitudes of American lawyers and businessmen were in great part confirmed by his experience in New York. Kissinger went to New York knowing very little about any profession other than his own; he returned to Cambridge with extensive knowledge about what certain of the principal American practitioners of other professions believed and said. More than that, he had established relations with a number of people whose friendship he valued; he maintained close associations with these men till the heavy responsibilities of the White House pushed him in quite other directions.

Nelson Rockefeller became a trusted friend. Rockefeller liked Kissinger, admired him for his intelligence and wit, and enjoyed his company. He received a good part of his education on national security and foreign policy from conversations with Kissinger. Building on his substantial knowledge of the problems of Latin America, Rockefeller had a better sense of how the introduction of nuclear arms had altered the American position in the world. Because he learned best through personal encounters, Rockefeller spent a great deal of time with Kissinger. Kissinger enjoyed the association, not least because he admired Rockefeller's loyalty and enthusiasm. He knew how much Rockefeller esteemed him, and it was impossible for him not to be moved by that knowledge.

Among the many others Kissinger met while in New York, two men particularly influenced him—Caryl Haskins and John Gardner. Haskins, president of the Carnegie Institution of Washington, was the first prominent scientist whom Kissinger came to know well. He helped with both the Council on Foreign Relations study and the Rockefeller Brothers Fund reports. Kissinger became devoted to him. He immensely appreciated Haskins's critical abilities and submitted almost everything that he wrote to him in manuscript form. Kissinger, knowing how difficult it was to write well, admired the grace of Haskins's prose, evident in the annual reports he published as president of the Carnegie Institution, but also in his correspondence, which greatly impressed Kissinger. He felt grateful to the Council for having brought him together with Haskins, a man of exceptional generosity and gentleness.

Through the Special Studies Project, Kissinger came to know John Gardner, the president of the Carnegie Corporation. Again, a close relationship developed, which was cemented by many hours of talk. Gardner, preoccupied with the problems of "excellence," combined the scholar's appreciation of the difficulties of achieving high levels of competence in a democracy with the public servant's determination to do something to effect that purpose. An intellectual who prized action, he wanted very much to communicate his ideas to a larger audience. He and Kissinger became good friends; Gardner's report for the Rockefeller Brothers Fund Project drew heavily on conversations that extended over many months in New York. Kissinger had reason to be grateful for such associates.

New York was where Henry Kissinger started his American life. Just as he had needed to get away from Washington Heights to learn something of what America was about, so he needed to leave Cambridge for a while to appreciate more keenly the variety of American intellectual and political experience. In his association with Rockefeller, no less than in his association with the Council on Foreign Relations, the teacher became also the student. Kissinger, who always knew how to listen, profited immensely from being required to do this in the company of men whose experience of life was considerably greater than his own.

The Eisenhower Years

A Radical Critique

The two years that Henry Kissinger spent in New York were absolutely crucial for his career. He lived in the midst of a bustling city, sometimes in great isolation, choosing to see almost no one for days on end. The small apartment on East 73rd Street where he and his wife spent a great part of their time was almost monastic in character; it was as if a vow of silence had been imposed. An unrelenting work schedule permitted Kissinger to write, revise, and publish *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy* in something less than two years. Only the most extraordinary self-discipline made it possible for such a schedule to be maintained. It was as creative a time for Kissinger as he had ever known; he looked back on the experience with some nostalgia, not so much for what he had been able to accomplish as for the support he had received. He had never been treated more considerately; he had never been made to feel that so much depended on what he was doing.

Kissinger had maintained his ties with Cambridge even when he lived in New York; because he remained responsible for the International Seminar and continued to edit *Confluence*, he visited Cambridge regularly and spent his summers there. In the fall of 1957 he left New York permanently, though he did not sever his relations with the Rockefeller Special Studies Project. He expected that he would be required to spend several days in New York each month till the greater number of the panel reports were completed. Appointed a Lecturer in Government at Harvard, he went to Cambridge to resume his academic career. No one—least of all

his senior colleagues in the Government Department—took much notice of his return. He came not as a famous man but as a still fairly anonymous younger member of the Harvard faculty. He was no more lionized in 1957 than he had been in 1950; men and women who barely knew him did not delight to talk of their chance encounter with “Henry”; he was just another member of the Harvard junior faculty.

Yet something had changed, and Kissinger was soon made aware of the gap that separated him from what he had been at the beginning of the decade, a recently graduated Harvard senior. The Council on Foreign Relations had put him into touch with dozens of people whom he might not otherwise have met; the Special Studies Project had established a close bond with Nelson Rockefeller. In all these instances, the relation was not social; it was based on a shared interest in foreign policy issues. Not everyone in Cambridge ignored the importance of such associations for someone who clearly aspired to influence public policy. Also, some, at least, wondered what Kissinger’s influence would be in the rapidly developing field of international relations at Harvard. When Kissinger had been an undergraduate, that field had been largely untended. There were a scattering of courses in several departments, but no major centers. Now a Center for International Affairs was being organized, and Kissinger had been appointed Associate Director. What form would the Center take? Would it resemble the Russian Research Center, organized in 1948, and concentrate on supporting basic research, or would it aim for a more activist role? These were all unanswered questions when Kissinger returned to Cambridge in 1957. When he had left in 1955, he had held the rank of Instructor; he was now awarded the rank of Lecturer. While the rank was an anomalous one at Harvard, and could signify almost anything, in the case of Kissinger it seemed to imply departmental confidence; there was a good prospect of his being promoted to a permanent position on the faculty at an early date. McGeorge Bundy, the Dean of the Faculty of Arts and Sciences, had held the same rank for two years in the Government Department before being named an Associate Professor. Would the same thing happen to Kissinger? It was difficult to know, but by being appointed Lecturer, he had almost certainly avoided the longer route to academic tenure that generally required an individual to spend three years as an instructor and five years as an assistant professor.

Kissinger, before he left Harvard in 1955, had some teaching experience; it made no very lasting impression on him. Serving as a teaching fellow in the early 1950s in one of the most popular undergraduate courses in the university, Kissinger almost never spoke of Social Sciences 2, where he conducted discussion-group sessions that touched on a broad range of philosophical and historical questions. The course, *Western Thought and Institutions*, brilliantly presided over by one of the university’s great lec-

turers, Samuel Beer, had already become something of a Harvard institution, but Kissinger seemed almost oblivious to its fame. It was not that he disliked the course or that he regretted having taught in it; it was simply that the experience of teaching undergraduates gave him no particular pleasure. He learned remarkably little from doing it. Nor, if the truth were told, did he learn very much from offering tutorial. Recalling his indebtedness to his own undergraduate tutor, Kissinger was pleased to take on tutorial obligations, but he recognized that he was only partially successful in fulfilling them.

Tutorial, of all the forms of instruction at Harvard, was far and away the most demanding. For a conscientious teacher, it meant weekly sessions with individual students, with the instructor being frequently required to read or reread texts he had assigned; memory would rarely suffice in a prolonged discussion with an able undergraduate who commanded a specific text. Such encounters were at least interesting; many others were dull. The obligation to read badly written and badly conceived student essays, and to correct them for stylistic shortcomings, for faults in logic, reasoning, and fact was never entirely satisfying. While no one of Kissinger's senior tutees presented him with a 377-page thesis, as he himself had done, the supervision of theses of even a hundred pages often imposed obligations of a kind that he would willingly have forgone. While Kissinger tried hard to keep his tutorial appointments, he frequently fell behind schedule in all his daily engagements. His tutees found him affable and interested, but it was impossible for them to ignore the increasingly frenetic character of his life. He rarely had as much time for them as Elliott had had for him.

When he returned in 1957, new teaching and administrative chores fell to him. In his first year as Lecturer, he collaborated with others in giving several courses; the preparation of these became a major concern. Again, Kissinger did as well as he could, but he never found the time to prepare to his own satisfaction. It was not until some years later that he gained the reputation for being an outstanding teacher. When he achieved that distinction—in part, because of very serious efforts he made to improve his teaching—his classes grew large, and he became well known among students in the university generally. In the 1950s, Kissinger enjoyed no such renown; he did not figure among the more distinguished teachers of the university, or even among the best in his own department. He began by offering two courses: a lecture course entitled *Principles of International Politics*, which he gave jointly with Daniel Cheever, and a seminar on *Administrative and Policy Problems of the United States in the Field of Diplomacy*, which he shared with his former teacher, William Y. Elliott.

Though Kissinger had great energy and resilience, and enjoyed excellent health, he was obviously overextended, too heavily involved in too

many disparate activities. His official duties at Harvard and his continuing obligations in New York would have been more than enough to keep him fully occupied. They represented only a small fraction of his total activities. Kissinger guarded his time less well than he ought to have done. The publication of *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy* brought him considerable public acclaim; there were now many more invitations to speak, lecture, and write; also, numerous private and governmental organizations turned to him, asking for his services as consultant or adviser. Kissinger did not always refuse them. Those who knew him slightly or cared little for him commented on what they regarded as the increasingly disorganized character of his life; he seemed always to be running, always late, and constantly harassed. Those who knew him better—and this included a number who both liked and admired him—were surprised less by his occasional lapses than by his continuing accomplishments. Despite all sorts of distractions, Kissinger continued to write, to attend conferences and committee meetings, and to do all the other things that became commonplace for prominent academics in the 1950s.

At Harvard, in addition to course teaching, tutorials, and work in the International Seminar, there were obligations that attached to his position as Associate Director of the Center for International Affairs. The post was one that he never came to enjoy. His relations with the Director, Robert Bowie, were never close, and Kissinger concluded at an early date that there was not much he could do to influence the shape the Center would take. He accepted his responsibilities there, particularly to the Fellows—higher civil servants or military officers, American and foreign—who came for a year on leave from their official duties. Occasionally, one of the Fellows became a friend; more often, they consulted Kissinger as they would any other member of the Harvard faculty. Kissinger participated in a number of the Center seminars and study groups, and gradually extended his knowledge of Harvard's social science faculty. Two Center colleagues, Edward Mason and Thomas Schelling, both economists, were particularly important for him. Mason's insights into developing countries were valued in many quarters, and Kissinger came to share the general admiration for him. So, also, he came to have great respect for Thomas Schelling, whose elegant theories had large implications for strategic thinking. Kissinger used the Center as a base of operations; it provided him with office facilities, secretarial and library services, and a convenient place for small meetings. He never felt great enthusiasm for the Center, and never thought it contributed to his own intellectual development in the way he hoped it might.

This did not prevent him, however, from acknowledging the help that it did give. Thus, for example, he felt indebted to the Center for its arms control seminar, which brought together MIT and Harvard professors

from various disciplines, together with a few others from outside, who then engaged in a continuing discussion of a whole range of problems that were then still very little understood. The Center's arms control group was small; it included Robert Bowie, Saville Davis, Max Millikan, Thomas Schelling, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., Marshall Shulman, Jerome Wiesner, and Jerrold Zacharias. While it would be wrong to select out from the group any single individual whose influence on Kissinger was paramount, several, including Jerome Wiesner, certainly exercised considerable authority. Wiesner's distinction as a scientist derived from work he had done on radio-wave propagation and on communication techniques and systems. His interest for Kissinger lay in his sensitive appreciation of the complexities of the problems of arms limitation. Before his return to Harvard in 1957, Kissinger's acquaintance with scientists was exceedingly limited. Neither the International Seminar nor *Confluence* had done much to make him familiar with the large and powerful scientific community. When he went to the Council on Foreign Relations he met a number of scientists, but with the exception of Caryl Haskins, none of them became his close friends. It was through the arms control seminar, and particularly through some of the men to whom Kissinger was introduced by Wiesner and others, that he began to have a more precise notion of the kinds of contributions scientists might make in the arms control area. Through the Rockefeller Brothers Fund Project, Kissinger had come to know Edward Teller, one of the few prominent American scientists who persistently expressed skepticism about most arms control proposals. It was useful for Kissinger to hear from scientists who held quite opposite views on many of the issues that he had first discussed with Teller. Kissinger had written about arms control in *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy*; he was now meeting regularly with others who were producing pioneer studies in that newly developed field.

Because natural scientists formed a truly international community of scholars, Kissinger profited from becoming acquainted with Americans who were in a position to introduce him to their colleagues abroad. He owed several of his initial meetings with Soviet scientists to introductions effected by his American scientific friends. Also, he soon became involved, though never in an important way, with the Pugwash movement, which traced its beginnings to a manifesto issued by Bertrand Russell in 1957. Russell had called for closer cooperation between Western and Soviet scientists concerned with the dangers of thermonuclear war. Plans were made for a small initial international gathering at Pugwash, Nova Scotia; the auspices were entirely private; Cyrus Eaton, the wealthy American philanthropist, provided the initial financial support. From these very simple beginnings, procedures were developed for larger international meetings. At a time when the opportunities for exchange were

very limited, the chance for Soviet, European, and American scientists to meet periodically, in fairly informal circumstances, to discuss issues of mutual concern to them, was highly valued. Arms control issues figured prominently in all the Pugwash discussions, whether held in Moscow or Stowe, Vermont. Kissinger was not a "charter" member of the American Pugwash group; he did not attend the Moscow meetings in 1969. He did, however, know many of those who went, and took a very considerable interest in what they discussed. Given that interest, he was soon invited to attend other of the Pugwash conferences.

In 1958, he added substantially to his teaching obligations at Harvard. He organized and became the Director of the Defense Studies Program. Those who were most critical of Kissinger—and the number never approached zero—were inclined to disparage the seminar he introduced under the Program. The course, Government 259, Defense Policy and Administration, brought high-ranking military and civilian officials from Washington (and elsewhere) to Cambridge for weekly two-hour sessions throughout the academic year. Kissinger presided; those who had little sympathy for the course suggested that it too often degenerated into a dialogue between Kissinger and his guest, to which the students were privileged auditors. For those who believed that Kissinger's principal pleasure in life was to surround himself with famous men, the seminar appeared to have no other rationale. Others, more sympathetic to Kissinger's effort, realized that he was introducing a new and important subject into the Harvard curriculum; and that he had organized the course in such a way as to make possible the kind of discourse in which he excelled. He enjoyed the weekly discussions; his carefully recruited staff instructed students in small group meetings more effectively than he would ever have been able to do. Kissinger knew that there was no adequate system of instruction in the field of strategic studies, and he was pleased to do something to help create the discipline. More than that, he was delighted to be able to do this at Harvard, where a very substantial number of able and interested students might be expected to enroll. Kissinger expected that the field would probably soon become highly specialized, and that this would exclude the kind of thinking that he deemed most important. Without disparaging technical research, Kissinger wanted to assert the importance of another kind—of the kind he himself was doing. He saw the possibility of achieving some of these purposes through the Defense Policy seminar.

Kissinger insisted that the seminar be open not only to students in the Faculty of Arts and Sciences but to students in all the graduate and professional schools. In the late 1950s, such freedom of cross-registration was not common at Harvard. Kissinger's concern was as much to "subvert" the lawyer, and make him rethink his professional goals—whether or